Greg Detre
8/2/02
session II, week IV
Dr Tasioulas
what�s my view???
moral relativism � dovetail with virtue theory � both insubstantial though�???
linguistic issues with cognitivism???
relaism/anti-realism � Dummett
absolute � reserve for normative force rather than interest-relativity
use contextualisation/environmental relativist
circumstances objectively alter cases
Banborough
what�s the sign of truth?
convergence � yes for Wiggins, no for McDowell
minimalist collapses into contextual relativism
play a role in logical inferences
the explanatory role of the truth, e.g. slavery collapsed because it was unjust and insupportable � substantially true
if we don't converge, �/span> indetermination
moral reasoning is insuffiicent alone to pick out a single preposition
eliding objectivity with determinateness (single right answer) � problematic
normative vs valuational judgements
what you ought to do is a function of all the little factors
but this leads to vagueness + conflict
Wiggins concentrates on valuational judgements
but McDowell is arguing that this too may not be so easy
i.e. there may be pluralism at both levels, but still objective
�there�s nothing else to think but �� is seeking determinism too much
rather we should think of constraints on what we can think
bounded pluralism within objective constraints
what about Kant? imperative is not truth-apt
grammatical transformation � �you should shut that door (if you�re rational)�
Kant � follow the correct procedure (Categorical Imperative, universal maxim) �/span> rationality
Wiggins � sensible subjectivist � mix
Mackie � subjective � not part of the fabric of the world
describing its essential nature requires you to bring in a perceiver for it to impinge upon
which leaves McDowell + Wiggins as subjectivists
xxx
no values without valuers
within that realm of values, can distinguish between good + bad valuers
Platonist vs Humean projectivist � opposite ends of subjectivism
both see a parent/child relatinoship between property + response
Wiggins + McDowell don't want to prioritise either one over the other
but it�s very hard to defend one without the other � circular, no explanatory work
need to attribute some explanatory power to the moral properties
e.g. slavery is unsupportable because it is
vs Marxian account
aren't moral beliefs like phlogiston � narrow explanatory scope
what about moral beliefs as epiphenomena???
these Nietzschean + Marxian explanations are unnerving because they sideline the role of morality
possible to have moral beliefs without most of them being true?
Davidsonian argument � need a background of agreement to give sense to disagreement
this background must include moral beliefs
to see others as humans, need to share a broad evaluative background
arg against Marx/Nietzsche etc. all embody such an implicit background
even value-free domains like natural science have quasi-moral
to-be-done-ness vs to-be-believed-ness
The Morals of Modernity � Charles Larmore(???), ch on Moral Knowledge
skeptical args are self-refuting
no place for hard naturalism in Wiggins and McDowell
Kant � Parfit, �Kant�s arguments and assumptions� on Philosophy faculty website - Lectures
how do Kant (+ Rawls) fit in Smith�s 3 part scheme???
Marxian picture of slavery as epiphenomenal on technology � AI slaves???